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Ever since David Hume introduced his price-specie flow mechanism 
in 1752, the question of external adjustment has been a classic issue 
for international macroeconomists. In 1968 Robert Mundell asked 
“To what extent should surplus countries expand; to what extent 
should deficit countries contract?” (Mundell, 1968). The debate in 
those days was about the relative merits of expenditure-switching and 
expenditure-reducing policies, analyzed within the useful template 
of the Mundell-Fleming model. Subsequent research introduced 
microfoundations, added an explicit dynamic dimension borrowed 
from optimal growth theory, and highlighted the role of expectations. 
Throughout this process, understanding the adjustment of a country’s 
external balances remained a key issue. By the early 1980s a modern 
synthesis had emerged, in the form of the intertemporal approach to 
the current account. It characterized the dynamics of external debt as 
the result of forward-looking decisions by households and investment 
decisions by firms, set in market structures of varying degrees of 
complexity. As Obstfeld remarks:
[This approach] provides a conceptual framework appropriate for 
thinking about the important and interrelated policy issues of 
external balance, external sustainability, and equilibrium real 
exchange rates… [and shifts] attention from automatic adjustment 
mechanisms and dynamic stability considerations to intertemporal 
budget constraints and transversality conditions for maximization 
(Obstfeld, 2001, p. 12).
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According to this intertemporal approach, a country’s current 
account at time t, CAt reflects expectations of changes in that country’s 
future economic circumstances, as follows:

















where NYt denotes net income (output minus investment and government 
expenditures), % is the difference operator (%NYs = NYs – NYs–1), R is 
the gross real return on a one-period risk-free international bond, and 
Et[.] is the expectation operator, conditional on information available 
at time t. According to equation (1), countries run current account 
deficits when future net income, NYs, is expected to improve, and 
run current account surpluses when future net income is expected to 
deteriorate. The smoothing motive at the heart of the intertemporal 
approach is immediate: countries run surpluses to offset future 
unwelcome developments, and run deficits in anticipation of future 
improvements in their standard of living.
This class of models provides useful insights about short-run 
dynamic issues, for example, the response to transitory and permanent 
shocks. In most empirical studies, however, it falls short of explaining 
the dynamics of the current account.1 Many empirical tests have been 
devised over the years. The most convincing ones—the present value 
tests—rely on a direct econometric verification of equation (1) using 
reduced-form vector autoregressions (VAR). The results often indicate 
that the implied current accounts—that is, the right-hand side of 
equation (1)—are too smooth compared to actual current accounts. 
In other words, the intertemporal approach accounts for only a small 
fraction of the movements in the current account.
Recent research argues that the focus on current accounts and 
fluctuations in future net income is misguided. Instead, one should 
focus on the determinants of a country’s net foreign asset position. 
The two are identical in the standard intertemporal model, since, 
by definition, the change in the net foreign asset position equals the 
current account. In reality, however, the change in a country’s net 
foreign asset position need not equal its current account. The reason is 
that the current account does not track unrealized capital gains arising 
from local-currency asset price and currency movements. To be more 
precise, define NAt+1 as a country’s net foreign asset position at the 
1. See Nason and Rogers (2006) for a recent assessment.  197 Valuation Effects and External Adjustment: A Review 
end of period t. The change in the net foreign asset position from one 
period to the next is given by the following accumulation equation:
NA R NA NX tt tt   1 ,   (2)
where NXt represents the balance on goods, services, and net transfers, 
and Rt represents the gross portfolio return on the net foreign portfolio 
between the end of period t – 1 and the end of period t.2 Adding and 
subtracting the net investment income balance, NIt, yields
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where the second line uses the following definition of the current 
account: CAt = NXt + NIt. The change in the net foreign position equals 
the current account, CAt, plus a valuation adjustment, VAt. This 
valuation adjustment (the term in brackets on the right-hand side of 
the second equation) equals the capital gain on the net foreign asset 
portfolio: the total net return minus income, dividends, and earnings 
distributed.3 In many countries, this valuation component has greatly 
expanded in the last two decade, following the sharp surge in cross-
border holdings of financial securities.
This paper reviews the evidence on the empirical relevance of 
this valuation component. Section 1 surveys the existing literature 
on patterns of cross-border asset holdings, in particular the pattern 
that emerges from the seminal empirical work of Philip Lane and 
Gian-Maria Milesi-Ferretti. It discusses the evolution over time and 
across countries of net and gross foreign asset positions since 1970 
for industrial countries and emerging markets. It then assesses 
the evidence on the importance of valuation effects, relative to the 
2. To be complete, the accumulation equation should also include the capital 
account, KAt, and errors and omissions, EOt. I abstract from these components in 
this discussion and bring them back in when necessary. Capital account transactions 
are typically small in many countries, especially industrialized countries. Errors and 
omissions are also excluded from the financial account in the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis estimates of the U.S. international investment position. Similarly, errors and 
omissions are reported separately in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006).
3. Technically, the net investment income balance also includes reinvested direct 
investment earnings. See Gourinchas and Rey (2007a) for a discussion of how to treat 
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current account, both for a large sample of countries and, more 
specifically, for Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States, based on more detailed evidence from Gourinchas, 
Lopez, and Rey (2006). 
Section 2 focuses on the United States, summarizing the empirical 
evidence on the role of valuation effects for the external adjustment 
presented in Gourinchas and Rey (2007b, 2007a). This section 
introduces the important conceptual distinction between expected 
and unexpected valuation effects. It argues that while valuation 
effects seem to be important, expected valuation effects may remain 
small for most countries other than the United States. Section 3 
turns to a discussion of the theory, with a review of some of the 
recent international portfolio models that give rise to unexpected and 
expected valuation effects. I essentially classify the literature into two 
strands: the complete markets setup, in which valuation effects are 
mostly unexpected and valuation terms reflect mostly the transfer 
payments associated with perfect risk sharing; and portfolio balance 
models (and their modern incarnation), in which predictable valuation 
terms play an important role. The final section then concludes.
1. PATTERNS OF NET FOREIGN ASSETS
None of the research presented in this paper would have been 
possible without the huge international effort in data collection of the 
last fifteen years. While data on balance of payments are generally 
available, for the reasons discussed above, they typically don’t provide 
accurate estimates of a country’s net foreign asset position. Starting 
in the 1980s, a number of national statistical agencies started to 
collect the information necessary to build estimates of net and gross 
external assets and liabilities at market value. For instance, the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis has provided annual data on the U.S. 
net international investment position at market value since 1991, 
with data going back to 1982 (see Landefeld and Lawson, 1991). 
Unfortunately, data for most countries remained fragmentary until 
quite recently.
The first important breakthrough came from the data collection 
efforts initiated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). While 
the fourth edition of the IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual (BPM4), 
published in 1977, introduced the concept of international investment 
position, it did not present a systematic framework for measuring 
its components. By contrast, the fifth edition of the manual (BPM5), 199 Valuation Effects and External Adjustment: A Review 
published in 1993, provides a set of comprehensive guidelines. In 
subsequent years, the IMF started to report member countries’ 
international investment positions (IIP). The initial coverage was 
limited (twenty-five countries in 1995), but it expanded rapidly 
through the Fund’s outreach efforts. By 2002, the Fund collected 
partial or complete information on eighty countries, with annual data 
going back to 1980, at best.
The second breakthrough occurred with the work of Philip Lane 
at Dublin’s Trinity College and Gian-Maria Milesi-Ferretti at the 
International Monetary Fund. Their database on the external wealth 
of nations, which was first published in 1991 (Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti, 2001), provided scholars with a set of very useful annual 
estimates of net and gross international investment positions for 
a sample of sixty-seven industrial and developing countries. Their 
database covered the period 1970–98, thus adding at least ten years 
of data to the IMF’s IIP database (and often much more than that, 
since many countries in the IMF database had only partial coverage). 
To construct net investment position at market value, Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti devised ways to estimate the valuation component, 
VAt, from balance-of-payments (flows) data, auxiliary data sources on 
world equity returns and exchange rates, and data on external debt 
from the World Bank, the OECD, and the BIS.4 A major update to the 
data set, released in 2006 (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2006), extends 
the sample to 140 countries with data through 2004.5 
Next, I review the evidence on net and gross foreign asset positions 
that emerges from this data set. I then focus more specifically on the 
importance of valuation effects in a few industrial countries for which 
more detailed data are available.
1.1 Pattern of Net Foreign Assets from the External 
Wealth of Nations
What does the External Wealth of Nations data set reveal about 
international investment positions? The first well-known fact is 
4. Given the lack of data, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) estimate foreign direct 
investment at book value, that is, correcting for currency fluctuations and assuming 
that the pattern of holdings of direct investment assets mimics the trade pattern.
5. The Mark II dataset differs from the original database along three main 
dimensions: errors and omissions are now reported separately; portfolio data uses data 
from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, when available; and direct 
investment is reported at market value when available.200 Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas
the dramatic increase in financial integration since 1970. Figure 1 
reports a commonly used measure of financial integration, the sum of 
gross assets and gross liabilities normalized by output, for a sample 
of industrial countries and a sample of emerging markets.6 For the 
sample of industrial countries, the index of financial integration 
increased from 45 percent of output to 302 percent. For the emerging 
sample, the index increased from 15 percent to 120 percent. The log-
scale of the graph reveals that the index of financial integration has 
increased at roughly the same pace for both industrial and emerging 
countries, about 6 percent per year. Figure 2 breaks down the series 
into gross assets and gross liabilities by group. The figure reveals 
a close match between gross assets and liabilities for industrial 
countries: each series grew at roughly 5.5 percent a year, from 20 
percent of output in 1970 to 150 percent in 2004. Closer inspection 
uncovers a modest build-up in imbalances, with net foreign assets 
decreasing from 3.4 percent of output to –6.5 percent. By contrast, 
the sample of emerging countries displays a closing of imbalances. 
These countries are net borrowers throughout the period. However, 
the ratio of gross assets to output increases from 3.4 percent to 54 
percent of output (a growth rate of 8 percent per year), while the 
ratio of gross liabilities increases from 12 percent to 66 percent (a 
growth rate of “only” 5 percent per year).7 Thus, despite greater 
access to international financial markets, there is no evidence that 
emerging markets could increase their collective net borrowing. 
This closing of net imbalances for emerging countries is the focus 
of much recent literature.8
While financial integration seems to have proceeded at a fairly 
constant rate, individual country experiences have grown more 
disparate. Figure 3 reports the cross-country dispersion in gross 
positions, as measured by the standard deviation of our financial 
integration index. The industrial countries in the sample record a 
dramatic increase in this measure after 1995, from roughly 118 percent 
of output to 393 percent. This is driven in part by the spectacular 
explosion in cross-border asset holdings of countries like Ireland (1,880 
6. See the appendix for a list of countries in each sample.
7. The fact that gross assets grew much faster than gross liabilities is consistent 
with an increase in net foreign liabilities (from 8 to 12 percent of output) for the 
emerging markets sample. The point is that net foreign liabilities increased much 
less than they would have if both gross assets and gross liabilities had been growing 
at the same rate.
8. See Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003), for a discussion of debt intolerance; 
see also Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) for a discussion of the allocation puzzle.201 Valuation Effects and External Adjustment: A Review 
percent of GDP in 2004), Switzerland (1,010 percent), and Belgium 
(819 percent). By contrast, the pattern of cross-country dispersion for 
emerging countries remains quite stable, at around 40 percent. On 
the other hand, figure 4 reveals a growing pattern of cross-country 
net external imbalances for both emerging and industrial countries. 
The cross-country dispersion increased from 22 percent in 1970 to 
51 percent in 2004 for industrial countries and from 12 percent to 46 
percent for emerging economies. 
Figure 1. International Financial Integration: (A + L) / Y (log 
scale)
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 2. Gross Positions: A/Y, L/Y (log scale)
Source: Author’s calculations.202 Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas
Figure 3. Cross-Country Dispersion in Gross Positions:
T[(A + L) / Y] 
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 4. Cross-Country Dispersion in Net Positions:
U[(A  L) / Y]
Source: Author’s calculations.
The next four figures characterize the change in the time-series 
process of gross assets and liabilities. I estimate the following 
process:
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where ai,t = Ai,t/Yi,t is the ratio of gross external assets to output and 
li,t = Li,t/Yi,t is the corresponding ratio of gross external liabilities to 203 Valuation Effects and External Adjustment: A Review 
output. This specification allows for a first-order autoregressive, or 
AR(1), component and also for a deterministic time trend that captures 
the gradual process of financial globalization. The AR coefficient, Sit ,
 , 
and the trend coefficient, Eit , , are estimated by rolling regressions, 
with a ten-year window.9 Figures 5 and 6 report the average serial 
correlation of gross asset and gross liabilities, while figures 7 and 8 
report the average volatilities TF,t. In figures 5 and 6 each data point 
represents the cross-country average of Si,t for a rolling regression over 
the previous ten years (so the value in 1980 represents the coefficient 
estimated over 1970–80). Figures 5 and 6 also report the two-standard-
deviation bands around the point estimates. The serial correlation of 
gross positions does not seem to have changed significantly over that 
period: it remains close to 0.5 and takes similar values for gross assets 
and gross liabilities. By contrast, the time-series volatility of log gross 
asset and liability positions (expressed as a percent of output) has 
increased significantly throughout the period, from about 3 percent 
to 13 percent of output for industrial countries’ gross assets and gross 
liabilities, from 3 percent to 6 percent for emerging countries’ gross 
assets, and from 5 percent to 9 percent for emerging countries’ gross 
liabilities. This means that over the last ten years, a one-standard-
deviation innovation to gross assets or gross liabilities represents 
between 12 and 14 percent of output for industrial countries and 
between 6 and 9 percent of output for emerging countries!
Figure 5. Serial Correlation of Gross Asset Positionsa
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. Ten-year rolling regressions; gross asset position measured as ln ai,t. 
9. It is rather hazardous to estimate an AR process with only ten observations. 
This is meant only as an illustration of the change in the empirical process for gross 
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This increase in the time-series volatility of gross foreign assets 
reflects the growing importance of valuation effects. This can be illustrated 
most dramatically by looking at a slightly different process:
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where nai,t denotes the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP, cai,t the 
ratio of the current account to GDP, and % the difference operator. 
Figures 9 and 10 report the standard deviation of the innovations as 
Figure 6. Serial Correlation of Gross Liability Positionsa 
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. Ten-year rolling regressions; gross liability position measured as ln li,t. 
Figure 7. Volatility of Gross Asset Positionsa 
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. Ten-year rolling regressions; gross asset position measured in logs, and gross asset positions is expressed as 205 Valuation Effects and External Adjustment: A Review 
Figure 8. Volatility of Gross Liability Positionsa 
Percent of GDP 
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. Ten-year rolling regressions; gross liability position measured in logs, and gross liability positions is expressed 
as percent of GDP.
a fraction of GDP. Most of the increase in the time-series volatility 
of the change in net foreign assets can be attributed to the valuation 
component.10 For industrial countries, innovations to the current 
account increased from 0.5 percent of output to 2.5 percent. Over 
the same period, innovations to the change in net foreign assets 
increased from 1.5 percent of output to 21.6 percent. Innovations to 
the change in net foreign asset positions were thus up to ten times 
larger than innovations to the current account between 1994 and 
2004 (the last data point). For emerging countries, the volatility of 
innovations to the current account remained remarkably stable at 
around 2 percent, whereas innovations to the change in net foreign 
asset increased from 2 percent to about 6.4 percent.
1.2 Deconstructing the Valuation Component: 
Currency and Asset Price Movements
The net foreign asset portfolio is a leveraged portfolio: it is short 
in domestic assets (the gross liabilities) and long in foreign assets 
(the gross assets). For instance, the U.S. net foreign asset portfolio is 
short in, for example, U.S. equities, U.S. bonds, bank deposits held by 
10. The decomposition is not exact since
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so the difference between the two curves also reflects the second term inside the brackets. 
This term is often negligible, however, since annual growth rates remain quite small.206 Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas
foreigners, and direct investment in the United States. It is long in, 
for example, Japanese equity, direct investment in Ireland and China, 
bank deposits in Switzerland, German government bonds, and U.K. 
guilds. The real total gross return on that portfolio, Rt+1, is defined as a 
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Figure 9. Volatility of the Innovations to the Change in Net 
Foreign Assets and the Current Account: Industrial Countriesa
Percent of GDP 
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. Ten-year rolling regressions; net foreign assets and the current account are measured as percent of GDP.
Figure 10. Volatility of the Innovations to the Change In Net 
Foreign Assets and the Current Account: Emerging Marketsa
Percent of GDP 
Source: Author’s calculations.





1 denote the total real return on gross assets and 
gross liabilities, respectively, Nt
a and Nt
l the portfolio weights At/NAt 
and Lt/NAt, respectively, and Nt
a –Nt
l = 1.11 As with any leveraged 
portfolio, the weights Na and Nl can be significantly larger then 
one, so even relatively small changes in asset prices can have a 
disproportionate effect on the overall net foreign asset position. To 
fix ideas, consider the case of the Chile. According to the Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti data set, as of 2004, gross assets represented 81 
percent of GDP, while gross liabilities represented 118 percent of 
GDP. The weights Na and Nl thus equal –2.19 and –3.19 percent.12 
Hence, a ten-percent excess return on gross foreign assets translates 
into a 22 percent improvement in the net position, or about 8 
percent of GDP!13
Beyond the impact of asset movements, Tille (2003) and Gourinchas 
and Rey (2007b) emphasize the role of currency movements. To 
illustrate how this might matter, I approximate the compounded 
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whereXih and Xif represent the share of asset i denominated in 
home and foreign currency, respectively, and r i
t+1= lnR i
t+1. The 
last line rearranges the portfolio terms according to the currency of 
denomination of the various returns. The first term in brackets on 
the right-hand side represents the contribution of domestic-currency-
denominated assets, while the second term in brackets represents the 
contribution of foreign-currency-denominated assets.
To make further progress, the real return on foreign-currency-
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is a real return expressed in terms of the relevant foreign basket 
of goods, and %Mt+1 is the rate of depreciation of the real exchange 




11. These weights are well defined as long as the net foreign position is different 
from zero. Even in that case, the total real return, Rt+1NAt, is well defined. 
12. To see this, note that Na = 81/(81 – 118) z –2.19.
13. The appendix reports the values of A/Y, L/Y and Na in 2004 for each country 
in the sample.208 Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas
represents the inflation rate in country i. Substituting into the above 
expression yields:
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The first two terms in brackets on the right-hand side represent 
the contribution of local real asset returns. The last term in brackets 
provides a measure of currency exposure of the net foreign asset 











measures the impact of a depreciation of the real exchange rate on the 
net foreign asset position of a country. It highlights that a measure 
of currency exposure must include the currency weights in addition 
to the portfolio weights. Unfortunately, this information is currently 
available only for a small number of countries. The next frontier 
in terms of data collection will be to compile information on the 
geographic and currency composition of gross external asset holdings, 
along the lines of the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Survey. 
In the meantime, detailed data are available for a few countries, 
like the United States, thanks to the work of Tille (2003, 2005) and 
Gourinchas and Rey (2007a). Table 1 reports Tille’s (2005) currency 
decomposition for the United States in 2004. At the end of 2004, the 
overall net foreign position represented –21.7 percent of GDP (85 
Table 1. Currency Composition of U.S. External Positions, 2004
Billions of U.S. dollars
Currency Assets Liabilities Net (A–L) Percent GDP
Total 9,973 12,515 –2,542 –21.7
U.S. dollar 3,476 11,869 –8,393 –71.5
Foreign currencies 6,497 646 5,851 49.9
Euro 1,784 296 1,488 12.7
U.K. pound 1,039 71 968 8.3
Canadian dollar 557 1 556 4.7
Japanese yen 506 61 445 3.8
Swiss franc 304 18 286 2.4
Other 2,307 199 2,108 18
Source: Tille (2005).209 Valuation Effects and External Adjustment: A Review 
percent in gross assets and 107 percent in gross liabilities), with dollar 
weights of 35 percent on gross assets (Xah = 3.48/9.97) and 95 percent 
on gross liabilities (Xlh = 11.869/12.515). This asymmetry implies 
that the United States holds a short position in U.S. dollars (to the 
tune of 71.5 percent of GDP) and a long position in foreign currency 
(roughly 50 percent of GDP). In terms of net foreign asset returns, 
the United States has a foreign currency exposure of –2.37 (obtained 
as [0.85*0.65–1.07*0.05]/0.21).
It is instructive to inspect equation (8) for different configurations 
of the currency denomination of assets and liabilities. If all assets 
are denominated in foreign currency while all liabilities are local, 
the exposure coefficient is maximized and equal to Nt
a. The above 
calculations indicate that even for a country like the United States 
this is a substantial overestimate of the true currency exposure 
(Na = –3.92). A fortiori, consider the situation of an emerging country 
with foreign-currency-denominated assets and, more importantly, 
foreign-currency-denominated liabilities (or dollarized liabilities), that 
is, a country with XX t
af
t
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so the currency exposure is limited to the size of the net foreign asset 
position. Since net foreign asset positions are typically much smaller 
than gross positions, valuation terms must remain comparatively 
smaller for emerging countries. On the other hand, valuation effects 
are also likely to be more destabilizing for borrowing emerging 
countries (Na < 0), because a depreciation of the domestic currency 
increases the local currency burden of a given net liability. 
One incorrect interpretation of these exposure numbers 
nevertheless captures an important element of the discussion. 
Specifically, with an exposure of –2.37, a 10 percent depreciation of 
the dollar would—holding everything else constant—create a positive 
wealth transfer for the United States of about 5 percent of GDP 
(–2.37*–0.217*0.1). Given a GDP of about 11.73 trillion U.S. dollars 
in 2004, this represents the nonnegligible sum of $585 billion! Such a 
wealth transfer would be of the same order of magnitude as the trade 
deficit for that year (5.2 percent of GDP, according to the U.S. Bureau 
of Economic Analysis).
This interpretation is incorrect precisely because everything 
else is not constant. If a currency depreciation is expected to deliver 
substantial wealth transfers to the United States, then foreigners 
will require some compensation in the form of higher expected 
local returns on dollar-denominated assets or lower expected local 
returns on foreign-currency-denominated assets. In fact, ex ante 210 Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas
local real returns should be expected to move in such a way as to 
neutralize the expected rate of depreciation. This arbitrage logic is 
precisely what stands behind the usual interest rate parity condition. 
Important valuation effects may still arise because the exchange rate 
differs from its expectation: with substantial leverage, expectation 
errors will translate into significant valuation effects, but these will 
not lead to predictable fluctuations in net foreign asset positions 
and thus cannot contribute to the external adjustment process. 
Predictable valuation effects that contribute systematically to the 
adjustment process require significant violations from the usual 
parity conditions. The evidence discussed so far does not attempt to 
distinguish between predictable and unpredictable valuation effects, 
yet the above discussion indicates that this is an essential element 
of the analysis. I return to this question in more details in section 
2, where I survey results for the United States.
1.3 Naive Net Foreign Assets versus Valuation Term
Tille (2003) for the United States and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2004) for Australia propose a decomposition of the change in net 
foreign assets into what they call a flows component (the opposite of 
the financial account) and price and exchange rate components that 
sum to the valuation term since 1990.14 I reproduce their findings 
in figure 11 for the United States and figure 12 for Australia. As 
expected, the U.S. exchange rate component is much larger for gross 
assets than for gross liabilities, reflecting the asymmetry in currency 
composition discussed above. What is striking is the importance of 
the capital gains on portfolio and direct investment positions (the 
price effect). For the United States, the price effect easily dwarfs 
the exchange rate effect in most years, while for Australia, the two 
components are similar in size. The price effects on gross assets and 
gross liabilities are of similar and offsetting size in the United States, 
whereas the exchange rate effects are of similar and offsetting size 
in Australia. These two figures clearly illustrate that a full account 
of the external adjustment process must involve a discussion of the 
joint determination of trade flows, asset returns, portfolios, and 
currency values.
14. The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis has published that information 
for the United States since 2005. It is available at www.bea.gov/international/xls/
intinv05_t3.xls.Figure 11. Change in NA: United States 
A. Change in US external assets
B. Change in US external liabilities
Source: Tille (2003) and Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2004).Figure 12. Change in NA: Australia
A. Change in external assets
B. Change in external liabilities
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2004).213 Valuation Effects and External Adjustment: A Review 
Using equation (3), one can write the change in net foreign assets 
relative to GDP between year 0 and year t as follows:
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where gt denotes the growth rate of output between periods t – 1 and t 
and, as before, lower case variables represent ratios to GDP. The first 
sum on the right-hand side corresponds to a naive estimate of the net 
foreign asset position, one that omits the cumulative valuation effects 
captured by the second summation term. Gourinchas, Lopez, and Rey 
(2006) construct detailed estimates of the net foreign asset position for 
the United States and the United Kingdom. Figure 13 reports their 
estimate of na as well as its decomposition between current account 
and valuation components for both countries, together with more 
preliminary data for Canada and Australia. The figure highlights 
that there is a variety of patterns for the valuation adjustment. In 
the case of the United States, valuation effects have been positive and 
relative moderate since the early 1980s, with a sharp acceleration 
in recent years. As of 2004, they account for 20 percent of GDP. A 
similar pattern is evident in Canada, which displays increasingly large 
valuation effects that also reach 20 percent of GDP and that reflect 
the importance of direct investment assets. The valuation component 
in both countries is never large enough to offset the naive estimate, 
except in Canada since 2000.
The United Kingdom exhibits a very significant and growing 
positive valuation component, in the context of very large gross 
positions (in excess of 300 percent of GDP), reaching 50 percent 
of GDP in 2000. This valuation component is so large that it 
overturns the naive estimates since 1980. Between 1980 and 2000, 
the cumulated current account deficits fall from 0 to –20 percent of 
GDP, while the correct net foreign asset position rises from 0 to 20 
percent of GDP. Since that time, the valuation component has been 
reduced by half, pushing the net foreign position into debt in 2002 
for the first time since 1977.
The case of Australia is also interesting. Here, valuation effects 
have been mostly small relative to cumulated current account deficits, 
but also negative, contributing to a worsening of the country’s already 
substantial net foreign liability. Figure 13. Valuation Component for Australia, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States
A. Australia
B. Canada
C. United Kingdom215 Valuation Effects and External Adjustment: A Review 
Figure 13. (continued)
D. United States
Source: Gourinchas, Lopez, and Rey (2006). 
Emerging economies also exhibit a variety of patterns. Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2004) provide a decomposition according to equation 
(9) for a number of emerging countries, between 1992 and 2001. Table 
2 reproduces their findings. The importance of these valuation effects 
is difficult to miss. Consider the case of Indonesia or Thailand. While 
the naive accumulation of current accounts would point toward a 
significant improvement in the net foreign asset position (32.9 percent 
and 11.9 percent of GDP, respectively), the valuation effect more than 
offset this (–39.0 and –21.9 percent of GDP, respectively). This reflects 
the impact of these countries’ devaluation on their dollarized liabilities. 
Nevertheless, not all emerging markets experienced negative valuation 
terms over the period (see the Czech Republic and Mexico).
Table 2. Cumulated Current Account and Valuation Terms
Percent of GDP
Country %nayt 4cayt vayt
Brazil –30.6 –17.5 –13.1
Czech Republic –29.4 –40.0 10.5
Indonesia –6.1 32.9 –39.0
Mexico –8.8 –27.7 19.0
Thailand –10.0 11.9 –21.9
Turkey –21.3 2.6 –23.9
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004). 216 Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas
In sum, the valuation component of the international investment 
position is large, sometimes sufficiently so to overturn the naive 
estimate constructed from cumulated current accounts. This 
component is also volatile. 
2. PREDICTABLE VALUATION EFFECTS: THE CASE OF THE 
UNITED STATES
Gourinchas and Rey (2007a) construct detailed estimates of the 
United States’ gross foreign assets and liabilities, disaggregated into 
four asset classes: direct investment, equities, debt, and other, where 
the latter category contains mostly official reserves, bank loans, and 
trade credit. The estimates are compiled from data from the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis on the U.S. international investment 
position, the Federal Reserve’s flow-of-funds data, and various surveys 
on the geographic and currency composition of portfolio and direct 
investment assets and liabilities.15 The data are also supplemented 
with data on equity returns, bond yields, and exchange rates, obtained 
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and the Global 
Financial Database. The resulting data allow me to address two 
important and related questions regarding, first, the composition of 
gross assets and liabilities and, second, the rates of returns on gross 
assets, ra, and gross liabilities, rl. 
Table 3 reports estimates of the share of gross assets and gross 
liabilities in the different asset classes, relative to GDP, for every 
decade between 1952 and 2004. Two evolutions are striking. First, the 
U.S. gross asset position has shifted increasingly toward high-yield 
risky assets, while its gross liabilities remain dominated by safer lower-
yield assets. While equity and direct investment assets represented 
only 8.75 percent of gross assets in the 1950s [(1.06+0.66)/19.6], 
the share reached 59.40 percent in 2000 [(26.56+16.04)/71.72]. By 
contrast, the share of liquid liabilities in total gross liabilities declined 
from 76.265 [(4.59+0.71)/6.95] to 54.5 percent [(25.07+26.47)/94.6], 
but it was always in excess of 50 percent. Second, in the 1950s, the 
U.S. net creditor position was concentrated in other assets (12.61 
percent of GDP), while net positions in equities, direct investment, 
15. See Gourinchas and Rey (2007a) for a detailed discussion of the data 
construction. See Hooker and Wilson (1989) for a reconciliation of the flow-of-funds 
accounts and the international transactions accounts from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis.217 Valuation Effects and External Adjustment: A Review 
and debt assets were mostly balanced (columns 9–12).16 By 2000, the 
composition of the net asset position shifted significantly: the U.S. 
net debtor position is now concentrated in debt instruments (–21.57 
percent of GDP). Interestingly, the net position in equity and direct 
investment remains almost exactly balanced, in part as a result of the 
decline in equity prices after 2001. Following Despres, Kindleberger, 
and Salant (1966), Gourinchas and Rey (2007a) argue that the United 
States is essentially a provider of global liquidity, issuing liquid 
liabilities and investing in high-yield, high-return assets.17
Turning to the second question, Gourinchas and Rey (2007a) 
decompose the overall excess return on gross assets relative to gross 
liabilities as follows:
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where E[.] denotes the expectation operator, μji is the share of asset 
class i (i  {o, d, e, f }) in gross assets (j = a) or gross liabilities (j = l), 
rji is the corresponding asset return, NNN
ia i l i  	
 2 is the average 
portfolio share for asset class i, and rrr
ia i l i  	
 2 is the average 
return on asset class i. The terms on the first line represent the 
return effect. They denote the average excess return on external 
assets relative to liabilities within each class of assets. This return 
effect is zero if the return is the same within each asset class (rai = rli). 
The terms on the second line represent the composition effect. They 
quantify the difference in weights between assets and liabilities for 
equity, foreign direct investment (FDI), and debt. This composition 
effect is zero if U.S. external assets have the same composition as 
U.S. external liabilities (Nai = Nli). Table 4 shows that the total real 
return on U.S. assets vastly exceeds the return on its liabilities (by 
2.11 percent). Moreover, this excess return mainly reflects a return 
16. Gold reserves represented a significant fraction of other gross asset holdings, 
at 5.24 percent of GDP in the 1950s.
17. See Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2007) for an analysis of global imbalances 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.219 Valuation Effects and External Adjustment: A Review 
effect, especially on debt and other assets (1.97 percent over the entire 
sample, and as high as 4.28 percent in the 1970s).
Table 4 illustrates an important finding: returns measured in 
common units are not equated. In other words, the arbitrage argument 
that I evoked above as putting some limits on the role of valuation 
effects does not appear to be strongly operating. Clearly, U.S. gross 
assets and gross liabilities are not close substitutes: even within classes, 
asset returns can be vastly different. Several factors could account for 
such large average excess returns. First, the asset classes considered 
are quite broad, so the return effect may, in fact, capture an equity-like 
premium. For instance, according to the United States was borrowing 
short and lending long in the Bretton Wood era (Despres, Kindleberger, 
and Salant, 1966), so the difference in maturities within the debt and 
loans category could account for the difference in returns. Another 
hypothesis emphasizes the role of the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency, 
or the greater liquidity and security of the U.S. financial markets. This 
would imply that foreigners are willing to hold underperforming dollar-
denominated or dollar-area-based assets as long as these assets provide 
these liquidity services. The excess return obtained by the United States 
can then be interpreted as an intermediation rent that relaxes the 
external constraint of the United States. Various names have appeared 
in the literature for these intermediation rents: exorbitant privilege for 
some, dark matter for others.18
3. VALUATION EFFECTS: SOME ELEMENTS OF THEORY
As I discussed earlier, valuation effects come in two flavors: 
unpredictable and predictable. The first variety does not create any 
particular difficulty for standard models of international finance: while 
analysts may argue over which model best characterizes international 
portfolio holdings, most models incorporate something similar to a 
parity condition in one form or another. Conceptually, perhaps the 
simplest way to understand unpredictable valuation terms is by 
reference to a complete market model. In such a setup, one could 
interpret valuation effects as the record-keeping of future payments 
on the contingent claims held by domestic and foreign investors, 
payments that implement full risk sharing. Interpreted in this light, 
the volatility generated by valuation adjustments could be interpreted 
18. See Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2007); Gourinchas and Rey (2007a); 
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as good volatility insofar as it reduces the volatility of marginal utility 
of consumption and improves welfare. 
By contrast, the predictable valuation effects that are relevant for 
the United States require large deviations from standard arbitrage 
conditions. Some limited progress has been made toward modeling 
predictable valuation effects with a revival of the portfolio balance 
literature associated with the work of Dale Henderson, Pentti Kouri, 
or the late Bill Branson.
3.1 Unpredictable Valuation Effect as Efficient Risk 
Sharing
One puzzling observation is that the increase in valuation effects 
documented in section 1 is not associated with an increased volatility 
in consumption. Surely, if wealth becomes more volatile because of 
valuation effects, then consumption should also become more volatile. 
There is little direct empirical evidence on this question, yet it seems 
fairly clear that consumption volatility has not changed much even 
though valuation effects have become increasingly prevalent.
One possible interpretation is that wealth is not becoming more 
volatile. This would be the case if, for instance, valuation effects 
reflect the flow payments associated with greater risk sharing. This 
hypothesis can be formally investigated with a simple complete market 
model. In such a model, the current account remains equal to zero 
after the initial period. Yet net foreign assets can change over time, 
purely from valuation effects. To see how this is possible, consider the 
symmetric pooling equilibrium of the Lucas (1982) model. A positive 
domestic endowment shock generates a dividend payment to foreigners 
(who are holding claims to half of the domestic tree). This income flow, 
duly recorded in the net investment income balance, exactly offsets the 
trade surplus of the home country (which consumes half of the world 
endowment), leaving the current account equal to zero.
The endowment shock may significantly change the value of 
the domestic tree relative to the foreign tree. Whether the value 
of the domestic tree goes up or down depends on the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution and the elasticity of substitution between 
domestic and foreign goods. Under the reasonable assumption that the 
value of the domestic tree increases following a positive endowment 
shock, this generates a valuation loss for the domestic economy. This 
valuation loss exactly offsets the present value of future expected 
trade surpluses of the home country, evaluated at the equilibrium 222 Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas
stochastic discount factor. Since the current account is equal to zero, 
trade deficits equal net investment income, and the net foreign asset 
portfolio also records the present value of future net income payments. 
Net foreign asset positions will thus change over time, but purely as 
a result of valuation adjustments. The extent of the predictability of 
asset returns depends on the time-varying risk premium that arises 
from undiversifiable aggregate risk. This class of models, however, 
does not typically generate economically significant fluctuations in 
the risk premium for realistic values of the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion. 
Gourinchas and Rey (2006) explore these insights formally in an 
endowment model similar to Kollman (2005). The model is simple: it is 
a complete markets model with two countries and two goods, à la Lucas 
(1982), where agents have mirror-symmetric preferences for their home 
good. This consumption home bias implies deviations from purchasing 
power parity and equilibrium movements in the real exchange rate. 
In the model, the net foreign asset position represents the value of 
a tail asset that prices sequences of future trade surpluses using the 
equilibrium unique stochastic discount factor. It is also possible to 
characterize gross assets from the portfolio holdings of the Lucas trees 
that implement the complete market allocation. Gourinchas and Rey 
(2006) find that there are very small—and economically negligible—
predictable valuation effects, no predictability of returns or exchange 
rates, and very significant unpredictable valuation terms, with net 
foreign asset positions that can represent many multiples of output.
Such models are not able to match the facts about the United States, 
but they may still provide an important benchmark for valuation terms 
and consumption volatility. Models based on improved risk sharing 
should all predict that the volatility of the relative marginal utility 
of consumption should decrease over time, as financial globalization 
and risk sharing increase. Whether this is the case remains an open 
empirical question.
3.2 Predictable Valuation Effects and Portfolio 
Balance Models
I now present a stylized and simplified portfolio balance model 
in which predictable valuation effects can arise in equilibrium. The 
model is a two-country version of Kouri (1982).19 Time is continuous. 
19. Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2005) analyze a similar model.223 Valuation Effects and External Adjustment: A Review 
There are two symmetric countries. Each country can invest either 
in domestic outside assets (D) or in foreign assets (D*). B represents 
the net foreign liabilities of the home country measured in domestic 
currency, W = D – B domestic wealth, and W* = D* + B/e foreign 
wealth. The nominal exchange rate, e, is defined as the domestic price 
of the foreign currency, while r and r* denote the instantaneous net 
returns on domestic and foreign outside assets (each measured in local 
currency). Assume further that the domestic (respectively, foreign) 
country wants to invest a fraction B (respectively, B*) of its wealth in 
its own asset. B and B* are a function of the expected excess return 
on the domestic asset versus the foreign asset: E(r* +  e/e – r) with 
Ba(.) < 0 and B*a(.) > 0.
I consider two possible scenarios. In the first scenario, countries 
borrow in their own currency and acquire external assets in the foreign 
currency. This situation is a good characterization for the United 
States. The second scenario considers a country that can only borrow 
in the foreign currency. This situation is closer to the experience of 
many developing and emerging countries who face the problem of 
original sin.
3.2.1 A stylized model of the U.S. external position: 
stabilizing and predictable valuation effects
Consider first the case in which the home country is a net debtor 
(B > 0) and gross liabilities (assets) are denominated in domestic 
(foreign) currency. Formally, B is defined as 
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with 0 b B, B* b 1. I simplify the analysis further by assuming that 
domestic nominal interest rates, r and r*, are constant and equal.
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The first term on the right-hand side reflects the domestic demand 
for the domestic asset; the second term reflects foreign demand for 
the domestic asset. The second equilibrium condition is the balance-
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The first term on the right-hand side represents interest payments 
to foreigners; the second term represents interest payments received 
from foreigners; The third term is the trade balance, expressed as 
a function of the nominal exchange rate and domestic and foreign 
wealth., I assume that changes in wealth directly affect the trade 
balance. Specifically, I assume that a depreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate or an increase in foreign wealth improve the trade 
balance (NXe, NXw* r 0), while an improvement in domestic wealth 
worsens the trade balance (NXw b 0). Substituting the definition of 
net external debt isolates the role of valuation effects in equation 
(13), as follows:
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The first two terms on the right-hand side sum to (the opposite of) 
the current account. The last term represents the valuation term. Since 
r = r*, this valuation term arises purely from fluctuations in the value 
of the currency. When gross liabilities are denominated in domestic 
currency and gross assets are denominated in foreign currency, a 
depreciation of the exchange rate reduces the country’s external debt 
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Taking D, D*, r, and r* as given, equations (12) and (13) form a 
dynamic system in B and e. Setting  e= 0 in equation (12) yields the 
first steady-state relationship, which I label the portfolio balance 
relation (following Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa, 2005):
20. The valuation term depends on the realized depreciation of the currency.225 Valuation Effects and External Adjustment: A Review 
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where e  and  B denote the long-run equilibrium values of the currency 
and external debt, respectively, while B0 = B(0) and B*0 = B*(0) 
represent the steady-state portfolio shares. The slope of the relation 





















This slope is positive when B0 + B*0 > 1, that is, when there is 
portfolio home bias. When this condition is satisfied, the domestic 
demand for the domestic asset (B0) exceeds the foreign demand for the 
domestic asset (1 –B*0). This guarantees that an increase in external 
debt is associated with a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. 
The increase in external debt makes the home country poorer and 
the foreign country richer. Under equity home bias, the decline in 
the domestic demand for the home asset exceeds the increase in the 
foreign demand for the home asset. Hence, there is excess supply of 
the domestic asset at the initial exchange rate. To restore equilibrium 
on the asset market, the exchange rate needs to depreciate, making 
foreigners richer (in domestic currency) and increasing their demand 
for the domestic asset.
Setting  B  = 0 and   e = 0 in equation (13), I obtain the second 
steady-state condition, which I label the current account balance 
relation:
0= , , /
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The model predicts that eventually, trade surpluses must be 
sufficient to cover interest payments on net foreign debt. The valuation 
term disappears in the steady state. Thus, while valuation effects 
influence adjustment dynamics, they do not replace the need for an 
ultimate adjustment in net exports via expenditure switching or 
reducing mechanisms. This point is developed in detail in Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (2004), and is consistent with the results of Gourinchas 
and Rey (2007b). The slope of the current account balance relation 
depends on the values of Ze and ZB. I assume that Ze < 0 and ZB > 0. 226 Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas
Ze < 0 when the expenditure switching effect (NXe > 0) is stronger than 
the wealth effect (NX w*B/e2 > 0). Moreover, ZB > 0 when the impact 
of the increase in debt on interest payments (r) exceeds the wealth 
effect on the trade balance (NXw – NXw*/e < 0).21
Under these assumptions, the current account balance relation 
is upward sloping. An increase in external debt increases interest 
payments and requires a depreciation of the currency that stimulates 
the trade balance.
To illustrate the model dynamics, figure 14 plots the two relations 
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In that case, it is easy to check that the dynamic system associated 
with equations (12) and (13) is saddle-point stable. The intersection of 
the two curves defines the long-run value of the currency and external 
debt, while the saddle path is also upward sloping.
Figure 14. Phase Diagram: Assets in Foreign Currency, 
Liabilities in Domestic Currency
Source: Author’s construction.
Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2005) provide an interpretation of 
condition (16). Consider a movement along the   e = 0 schedule stemming 
21. It is easy to analyze the other cases where the wealth effects on debt are 
powerful enough to change the sign of Ze or ZB.227 Valuation Effects and External Adjustment: A Review 
from an increase in B. The currency must depreciate to keep the asset 
market in equilibrium. The increase in B has two effects on the balance 
of payments. First, it increases interest payments, thereby increasing 
external debt. Second, the depreciation of the currency improves the 
trade balance, which reduces external debt. The second effect needs to 
be stronger for saddle-path stability. This is condition (16).
To explore the response to a decline in the demand for domestic 
goods, consider now how the economy adjusts to an external shock, 
such as a permanent decline in the demand for domestic goods (that is, 
a negative shock to NX). The full dynamic adjustment is represented 
on figure 15. While the portfolio balance relation remains unchanged, 
the current account balance relation schedule shifts up: lower exports 
require a depreciation of the exchange rate if external debt is to remain 
unchanged.
Figure 15. Response to a Negative Demand Shock
Source: Author’s construction.
How does the economy adjust to this shock? On impact, the economy 
jumps from point A to point B, on the new saddle path. Because external 
assets are denominated in foreign currency, the sudden depreciation of 
the currency generates a valuation gain that reduces B. This valuation 
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The size of the valuation gain (the horizontal component of the 
segment [AB]) depends on the gross asset position. A larger gross 228 Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas
asset position, (1 – B0)W, implies a larger valuation gain.22 From 
point B, the exchange rate depreciates further, to point C, while 
external debt increases. In the long run, both B and e increase. 
Along that path, the exchange rate is expected to depreciate (  e> 0), 
and the current account, while improving, remains in deficit, that 
is, foreigners are lending (  B> 0). To understand what is going on, 
consider what would happen if the currency depreciated sufficiently 
to maintain the current account balance (point Ba). In that case, the 
depreciation of the currency would stimulate the foreign demand for 
domestic assets, as foreigners become richer in domestic currency.23 
Equilibrium on the asset market requires that the currency be 
expected to depreciate further to discourage the demand for domestic 
assets. This expected depreciation would further stimulate exports 
and reduce net foreign debt, however, pushing the economy away 
from the conjectured equilibrium.
What happens instead is that the currency depreciates on impact, 
but less than needed to stabilize the current account. This depreciation 
stimulates the demand for domestic assets. What counters this effect 
is the expectation that the currency will depreciate further in the 
future. Since the exchange rate does not depreciate all the way to the 
current account balance relation, the trade balance worsens and the 
country borrows more.
Foreigners are willing to lend despite the expected currency 
depreciation for two reasons. First, as net foreign debt increases, 
the rate of depreciation,  e, decreases and foreign assets become 
progressively less attractive. Second, as e increases, the share B/e/W* 
decreases given B, so foreigners want to rebalance their portfolio by 
increasing their holdings of domestic assets.
3.2.2 A stylized model of an emerging country’s external 
position: destabilizing and predictable valuation effects
In the previous scenario, valuation effects are stabilizing. Consider 
now the case of a country forced to borrow in the foreign currency. 
22. Since B and e are determined from the steady-state conditions, one might 
be tempted to conclude that valuation gains have no impact on the long-run required 
depreciation or the change in external debt (the move from point A to point C). This 
would be incorrect since an increase in the cross-border positions coming from either a 
lower home equity bias (lower B0 and B*0) or greater wealth (a larger D and D*) would 
change the steady-state schedules, as well. A decrease in B0—while still satisfying 
condition (16)—would reduce B and e. 
23. When 0 < B0 and B*0 < 1, eD* + B increases even though B decreases,229 Valuation Effects and External Adjustment: A Review 
In terms of the model, this is equivalent to assuming that B* = 1 and 
B > 1. The net foreign debt, B, is equal to (1 – B)W > 0.
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since only domestic agents acquire the domestic asset. The balance-
of-payments condition becomes
 
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The last term represents the valuation term, as before. Two 
points are worth noting. First, the depreciation of the exchange rate 
applies to the net position, not the gross. This is simply because net 
and gross positions coincide in this case. Second, a depreciation of the 
currency worsens the external positions, because debt is denominated 
in foreign currency.








The external debt in local currency is a constant fraction of initial 
assets, regardless of the value of the exchange rate. This implies that 
the foreign currency debt, B* = B/e, and the exchange rate, e, move 
precisely in inverse proportions. 
I obtain the current account balance relation by setting   B = 0 and 
 e= 0 in the balance-of-payments relation (18):
0= ,,
=,








This is the same schedule as before, and I maintain the 
assumptions that ZB > 0 and Ze < 0: an increase in external debt 
requires a depreciation of the domestic currency. 230 Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas
Figure 16 presents the dynamic analysis. The local dynamics are 
always saddle-point stable, and the saddle path is upward sloping, 
as before. Hence, the model with foreign currency debt also features 
predictable currency and excess returns.
Figure 16. Response to a Negative Demand Shock: Case of 
Original Sin
Source: Author’s construction.
The adjustment to an external shock is profoundly different from 
the previous case, however. Consider, as before, the case of a permanent 
decline in the demand for domestic goods. The portfolio balance relation 
remains vertical and unchanged, since the long-run local currency 
value of the external debt is unchanged. The current account balance 
relation schedule shifts up: lower exports require a depreciation of the 
exchange rate if external debt is to remain unchanged.
How does the economy adjust to this shock? Starting from the 
initial equilibrium at point A, the exchange rate suddenly depreciates 
to point B. This depreciation creates valuation losses ( ee /  B > 0) that 
increase the country’s net debt. This necessitates a larger initial 
depreciation than that required by the current account balance 
relation. To see why, consider what would happen if the currency 
depreciated up to point Ba, where current account balance is restored. 
At that point, the increase in external debt reduces domestic demand 
for the domestic asset. Equilibrium on the asset market thus requires 
that the domestic currency be expected to appreciate, but this expected 
appreciation would further increase external debt, requiring still 
further expected appreciation and pushing the economy away from 
the conjectured equilibrium.231 Valuation Effects and External Adjustment: A Review 
Instead, the exchange rate needs to overshoot its long-run 
equilibrium value and then appreciate back. The overshooting of 
the exchange rate has to be sufficient to trigger an improvement in 
the trade balance, despite the initial negative shock. In turn, this 
improvement in the trade balance is what is necessary to reduce the 
external debt back to B. As the economy moves from point B to point 
C, the exchange rate appreciates at a declining rate, while the external 
position improves. The exchange rate eventually depreciates, while 
the debt in foreign currency decreases (B* =B/e).
For emerging countries with foreign-currency-denominated 
liabilities, both the exchange rate and the trade balance become more 
volatile. This is due to the fact that the initial depreciation makes 
the country poorer, not richer. Following a sudden stop episode, the 
response of the trade balance and the exchange rate will need to be 
larger in countries with liabilities denominated in foreign currency and 
smaller in countries with liabilities denominated in domestic currency. 
This also implies that the trade balance and valuation component 
should be negatively correlated, a fact that seems to be borne out by 
the data presented in table 2.24
In contrast to the relatively innocuous valuation effects of the 
perfect-risk-sharing model, or the stabilizing effects that seem to be 
at work in the United States, valuation effects can be significantly 
destabilizing for many emerging countries, given the currency 
composition of their external balance sheet. It remains to be seen 
whether and how the increased importance of the valuation terms 
affects consumption and welfare.
4. CONCLUSION
This paper has provided a quick panorama of the empirical and 
theoretical research on the role of valuation effects for the external 
adjustment. On the empirical side, valuation effects are here to stay. 
The phenomenal increase in cross-border asset holdings opens the door 
to massive wealth transfers from relatively small price and currency 
movements. Short-term movements in a country’s external asset 
position increasingly appear to be driven by the valuation component. 
The paper also expounded the distinction between predictable and 
unpredictable valuation effects. The former arise naturally and do not 
pose any particular theoretical or empirical challenge. For instance, 
24. Brazil is the exception.232 Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas
in a world with perfect risk sharing, valuation effects simply reflect 
the record keeping of future payments on the contingent claims held 
by domestic and foreign investors, payments that implement full 
risk sharing. Interpreted in this light, the volatility generated by 
valuation adjustments could be interpreted as good volatility, insofar 
as it reduces the volatility of marginal utility of consumption and 
improves welfare. However, the empirical evidence on the United 
States indicates that predictable valuation effects are important, at 
least in that particular case. The last section of this paper showed 
how such effects arise in a simple portfolio balance model. The model 
suggests that valuation effects are perverse for emerging countries 
with dollarized liabilities and stabilizing for countries like the United 
States, whose external debt is denominated in dollars. The model 
also suggests that the valuation terms and the trade balance should 
be negatively correlated for emerging economies, while their trade 
balance and exchange rate should be much more volatile than their 
developed counterpart. On the empirical front, testing these empirical 
implications should be the obvious first step. On the theoretical front, 
future research should extend the simple model presented here to a 
full-fledged international, intertemporal dynamic portfolio model. APPENDIX
Sample Countries
Table A1. Industrial Countries, 2004
Country A/Y L/Y μa
Australia 0.82 1.46 -1.28
Austria 1.88 2.05 -10.82
Belgium 4.25 3.94 13.75
Canada 0.99 1.12 -7.93
Denmark 1.95 2.08 -15.70
Finland 1.95 2.08 -16.14
France 2.12 2.06 39.80
Germany 1.67 1.59 20.76
Greece 0.67 1.40 -0.91
Iceland 1.49 2.42 -1.60
Ireland 9.30 9.50 -47.16
Italy 1.05 1.24 -5.82
Japan 0.89 0.51 2.34
Netherlands 4.03 4.08 -69.12
New Zealand 0.67 1.59 -0.73
Norway 2.06 1.41 3.18
Portugal 1.76 2.46 -2.53
Spain 1.25 1.75 -2.56
Sweden 2.13 2.23 -22.41
Switzerland 5.71 4.40 4.36
United Kingdom 3.57 3.71 -27.08
United States 0.84 1.07 -3.71
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) and author’s calculations.Table A2. Emerging Countries, 2004
Country A/Y L/Y μa
Argentina 0.88 1.36 –1.85
Brazil 0.28 0.78 –0.57
Chile 0.81 1.18 –2.19
Colombia 0.36 0.71 –1.03
Mexico 0.20 0.63 –0.46
Venezuela 0.89 0.73 5.33
China 0.55 0.47 6.94
India 0.23 0.34 –2.15
Indonesia 0.24 0.76 –0.46
Korea 0.53 0.57 –13.05
Malaysia 1.11 1.13 –54.37
Philippines 0.39 0.98 –0.67
Taiwan 2.07 0.65 1.46
Thailand 0.45 0.74 –1.54
Czech Republic 0.64 0.99 –1.85
Hungary 0.42 1.39 –0.43
Poland 0.32 0.85 –0.59
Russia 0.67 0.66 140.65
Israel 0.94 1.16 –4.29
South Africa 0.65 0.70 –12.77
Turkey 0.28 0.76 –0.60
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) and author’s calculations.235 Valuation Effects and External Adjustment: A Review 
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